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Recent debates have suggested that taxation is very detrimental to labour force participation 
and employment. However, some countries - notably the Scandinavian - stand out as 
contradictions to this view since they have managed to sustain high labour force participation 
rate despite high tax rates and a generous social safety net. This either refutes the standard 
incentive argument or leave the Scandinavian countries as a puzzle. This paper argues that 
both the standard view and the Scandinavian experience can be reconciled when taking into 
account both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives build into the social safety net. The 
social safety net in the Scandinavian countries is at the same time both generous and 
employment conditioned. It is shown that these conditionalities can make high labour force 
participation consistent with a high marginal effective taxation of labour, and that it on the 
margin lowers the marginal costs of public funds. Such employment conditionalities make it 
possible to achieve distributional objectives without jeopardizing the incentive structure. 
JEL-Code: J01. 
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acknowledged. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Scandinavian countries are characterized by both high labour force participation and employment rates
as well as a high tax burden on labour income and a generous social safety net. This challenges the
standard perception that both taxes and transfers reduce incentives to work.
The role of taxes for economic performance in general and labour market participation and employ-
ment in particular is a recurrent theme. A recent wave in this debate has been fuelled by the controversial
paper by Prescott (2004), arguing that diﬀerences in labour supply (measured as total hours supplied
relative to population size) between the US and some larger European countries can be accounted for by
the diﬀerence in tax rates. Hence, by implication, if these European countries were to reduce taxes to
the US level, the labour input would be about the same on a per capita basis, and such reductions would
be self-ﬁnancing (see also Ohanion, Raﬀo and Rogerson (2006)).
While provocative, these claims are based on an implausibly large labour supply elasticity way above
any available empirical micro evidence12. Moreover, a closer look at the cross-country evidence reveals a
more complicated picture than implied by the simple "tax and labour supply" view, and the performance
of the Scandinavian countries in particular is an outlier or paradox in this respect.
The co-existence of a high tax burden on labour and a generous safety net in the Scandinavian
countries seem to pose a signiﬁcant distortion of labour supply incentives. In the economics literature,
a generous social safety net is often portrayed as a "subsidy to leisure" or as "paying people for not
working".
Many government spending programs implicitly provide a marginal subsidy to leisure since
they stipulate that beneﬁts are conditional on not working, or that the beneﬁt is reduced in
response to any labour income. Relevant examples include some components of social security,
unemployment insurance, traditional welfare programs and disability (Rogerson, 2007, p 73).
This line of reasoning identiﬁes the composite tax rates (metr: marginal eﬀective tax rates) on labour
market participation (i.e. the combined eﬀect of taxes lowering the return to work, and the loss of
transfers) as crucial for determining labour force participation, and by implication they are high in
countries like the Scandinavian with a generous tax ﬁnanced social safety net.
In the political science literature, the same issue appears but from a diﬀerent angle since the focus is
on the extent to which social policies lead to a decommodiﬁcation of labour. By decommodiﬁcation is
understood that selling of labour3 is not a necessity to maintain a decent standard of living.
1Prescott (2004) assumes a labour supply elasticity of nearly 3. This is signiﬁcantly larger than in micro studies which
usually ﬁnd the elasticities to be small and below one. For recent surveys see e.g. Evers, De Moij and van Vuuren (2005) and
Meghir and Phillips (2008). Recent work has assessed elasticities using reported income which leads to higher elasticities
(although the interpretation is open to debate, see Chetty (2008)), but even these elasticities are not as high as assumed
by Prescott,
2Other arguments have been that Europeans have a stronger preference for leisure, that the welfare state via generous
beneﬁt levels lowers labour supply, and the role of imperfect competition (unions), see e.g. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote
(2005), Ljundqvist and Sargent (2007), and Gordon (2006).
3Also expressed as "the concept refers to the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable
standard of living independently of market participation" Esping-Andersen (1990, p 37).
2A minimal deﬁnition must entail that citizens can freely, and without potential loss of
job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p 23).
Decommodiﬁcation is seen as an integral part of the universal welfare model stressing that entitlements
are based on citizenship and needs rather than performance. If the social safety net in the Scandinavian
countries is taken to support decommodiﬁcation of labour (see Esping-Andersen (1990)), it follows that
the Scandinavian countries come close to the universal model4. The decommodiﬁcation interpretation
goes hand in hand with the incentive view of the welfare state; that is, the economic incentives to supply
labour are weakened by welfare arrangements.
This paper argues that neither of the above views give an accurate description of the Scandinavian
welfare model, and that conditionalities in the social safety net help explain the employment-tax/social
safety net pattern observed. The social safety net is generous by international standards in the Scandi-
navian countries, and it builds on universal individual rights which are collectively ﬁnanced by taxation.
However, the scheme is at the same time conditional on individual behaviours. These conditions have a
strong employment or work focus, that is, the eligibility not only for unemployment insurance both also
social assistance is conditional on documented active job search, participation in activation programmes
(job training, education etc.) etc. Hence, by focussing only on the pecuniary aspects of the system one
may wrongly conclude that the system subsidies non-work, but by including the conditionalities or non-
pecuniary incentives it follows that generous beneﬁts can be consistent with maintaining incentives for
job search and work. This can also be phrased in the way that these conditionalities make it possible to
oﬀer more generous transfers consistent with distributional objectives without jeopadizing the incentive
structure for work. This interpretation has implications not only in accounting for the experience of the
Scandinavian countries but also for the more general debate about the role of incentives and design of
labour market and social policies.
There is a vast literature exploring the incentive implications of taxes and the social safety net. In
relation to the speciﬁc theme of this paper it is most relevant to point to other explanations why a
generous social safety net is not "over exploited". One key argument is stigmatization arising when
individuals ﬁnd that living on transfers is less socially acceptable than living on earned income. In
as e m i n a lp a p e rM o ﬃtt (1983) shows how stigmatization can explain why take up rates among those
eligible for speciﬁc social transfer programmes are less than 100%. While stigmatization is surely an
important aspect it is not an obvious explanation of the Scandinavian experience. Rather it has been
a policy aim to minimize stigmatization by making eligibility to various welfare arrangements rights-
based. The basic argument is that it from a welfare perspective is not desirable that take up rates are
below 100% since this implies that some deserving abstains from receiving the aid they are intended
to get, and for those who claim the transfer there is no point in lowering their well-being by making
them perceive to be outsiders. The aim of the Scandinavian model is to foster social inclusion and avoid
4Various proposals on classiﬁcation of welfare regimes or models have been made in the literature. Esping-Andersen
(1990) made seminal a distinction between the liberal/residual, the continental/corporatist and the universal/social demo-
cratic/Scandinavian welfare model. This is used here since it is a convenient way by which to focus on the division of labour
between the market, the civil society and the state. However, no country ﬁts perfectly into these model categories, and
countries with strong universal elements are also found outside Scandinavia, e.g. the Netherlands.
3stigmatization. Another important aspect is the role of norms and the Scandinavian countries are often
portrayed as having a strong work ethic and strong work norms. Clearly strong norms can counteract
economic incentives (see e.g. Lindbeck et.al. (1999, 2003), Algan and Cahuc (2009)) and help explain
why employment is high despite weak direct economic incentives for labour supply. However, sustaining
strong work norms if they are inconsistent with economic incentives create a very liable situation in
contrast to the very resilient position of the Scandinavian position. Policies may both strenghen norms
and also be supported by norms. The employment conditionalities in the social safety net perform this
dual role since they maintain the focus on employment and thereby contribute to support work norms.
Moreover, if there are strong work norms it is easier to obtain political support for attaching work or
employment conditionalities to the social safety net, since the working population (and thus the majority
of tax payers) ﬁnd that transfer recipients like the working population have to oﬀer something in return
for their income (desert sensitive political preferences).
Based on an account of the design of the social safety net in the Scandinavian countries this paper
develops a simple model accounting for both the pecuniary (taxes and beneﬁts) and non-pecuniary
(employment conditionalities) incentives to work, and show how the latter helps account for high labour
force participation and employment rates despite high taxes and a generous social safety net. This can
also be phrased in the way that the employment conditionalities work to lower the distortionary eﬀects
of taxation. It is furthermore shown that such employment conditionalities make it possible for policy
makers with strong distributional goals to shift the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity concerns. This
paper is closely related to a mainly empirical literature exploring the eﬀects of active labour market
policies (for surveys see e.g. Kluver(2006)) for labour supply and employment. In general such policies
may aﬀect employment possibilities via human capital eﬀects and search eﬀects, but the present paper
focus for simplicity entirely on the incentive eﬀects of such policies5. The paper is also closely related to
work on labour supply on the extensive margin (for surveys see e.g. Evers et. al (2005) and Meghir and
Phillips (2008))
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives in a very brief form an account of the Scandinavian
position in comparative perspective, and outlines the conditionalities built into the social safety net. It is
shown that when accounting for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives the Scandinavian position
no longer remains a puzzle. Section 3 develops a simple model of labour supply, focussing on the interplay
between pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives to show how the latter in a fundamental way changes
the incentive structure and thus the distortions arising from a policy framework like the one adopted in
Scandinavia. This section considers also brieﬂy the welfare rationale for employment conditionalities in
the social safety net, and section 4 oﬀers a few concluding remarks.
5The theoretical literature on active labour market policies has mainly focused on wage eﬀects , but more recently the
search eﬀects have also been explored (see Holzner, Meier and Werding(2006) and Andersen and Svarer (2008). Besley and
Coate (1992) addressed in a seminal paper workfare as part of a poverty alleviation scheme. The model assumed a given
budget for transfers and assumed that transfers where given as a supplement to private market income (endogenous working
hours). The focus was on screening between deserving and non-deserving under incomplete information.
42 Scandinavia - an outlier?
The conventional metric to measure the extent to which work incentives are distorted by taxes and the
social safety net is the so-called marginal eﬀective tax rate (metr). The metr includes both the taxation
of income earned when working and the loss of transfer when shifting from non-work to work. This double
eﬀect implies that the metr can be rather high, both in general in countries with a generous tax ﬁnanced
social safety net (see European Commission (2005) and Centeno (2005)), and for speciﬁc groups where it
can be close to or even above 100%6. Figure 1 shows that the metr is 90-85% in Denmark and Sweden
suggesting very weak work incentives in the two countries.




























Note: Data applies to 2004
Source: Eurostat
It is well-known that labour force participation and employment rates in the Scandinavian countries
are high by international standards and close to the US level often used as a benchmark case. The high
level applies both for men and women, and also to groups with low education which may be particularly
aﬀected by the high metr, (see e.g. Andersen (2009) for data and references). Figure 2 provides a cross
plot of the labour force participation rate and the metr for European countries. This ﬁg u r e st h u sn o t
yield direct support to the mainstream view that a high metr is detrimental to labour supply and thus
employment, if anything it displays a (weak) positive correlation between labour force participation rates
and the metr. This "wrong" correlation is mainly driven by the Scandinavian outliers (DK, N, and S are
indicated by circles in the ﬁgure) having much higher employment rates than to be expected given the
high levels of the metr (see below). Is Scandinavia a strange outlier or can the Scandinavian experience
be reconciled with standard views on the role of incentives?
6One striking ﬁnding is that some persons are in employment even though they get a very low or even negative economic
return from working (see also e.g. Pedersen and Smith (2002)).
5Figure 2: Labour force participation and the marginal eﬀective taxation rate on work
European countries

































Note: The participation rate is for the age group 15-64, and the metr is the marginal eﬀective tax rate from
shifting between non-work and work, taking into account taxes and transfer income. Data: See tabel 1.
2.1 The social safety net and employment conditionalities
Assessing work incentives solely from the metr is too simple and presumes that the option of living
on transfers is available without any constraints or conditions. This easily leads to conclusions like
"subsidizing leisure" or "paying people for not working". However, this is an empirically inaccurate
characterization of the welfare policies underlying the Scandinavian model since they do not in general
leave various beneﬁts as a free choice but include a number of conditionalities determining eligibility.
By conditionalities are understood the conditions under which the individual acquires access to tax
ﬁnanced transfers and services. A basic question is whether the entitlement is a citizen’s right, or
whether it depends on some prior action like payment of a contribution, membership fee and the like. A
universal welfare arrangement is deﬁned as one where the "entry" condition is a citizen’s right granted
at an individual level. However, if citizenship was the only condition, social transfers would amount to
an unconditional income, i.e. a so-called demo-grant or basic income7. The transfers are however not
unconditional, and the conditionalities basically serve the purpose of ensuring targeting and maintaining
work incentives.
Labour market and social policies in the Scandinavian countries have a long tradition for building on
a so-called "work-line" based on rights and duties. Individuals have social rights but also duties with
respect to actions to be taken. The Swedish Rehn-Maidner model is a classical reference for pointing to
the duality between a generous social safety net and a compressed wage structure on the one hand and
active labour market policies on the other (see e.g. Erixon (2008)). Active labour market policies should
7A basic income is sometimes argued as being the ultimate example of decommodiﬁcation of labour and completion of
social rights, cf. Marshall (1950).
6be understood broadly to include various requirements attached to the eligibility in the social safety net
going from active job search to participation in education programmes, or job training. These policies
as such are not speciﬁc to the Scandinavian countries, but they stand out in the clustering of policies as
reﬂected by the fact that the Scandinavian countries top the list for both transfer generosity and spending
on active labour market policies (see OECD (2009)).
As an illustration of the complementarity between rights and duties in the design of the social safety
net ﬁgure 3 illustrates some key elements of the danish system. The systems in Norway and Sweden are
alike, but the danish is the most generous in terms of replacement rate and duration for unemployment
beneﬁts. The ﬁgure shows in the upper part the level of compensation oﬀered depending on the duration
of a non-work spell for a person who initially is eligible for unemployment beneﬁts8 and later transits
into social assistance. The beneﬁt level can not exceed 90% of the previous wage or a cap (indexed
to the general wage development), and therefore the replacement rate is declining in the previous wage
income. Accordinly low income groups have a replacement rate of 90% while the average production
worker has a replacement rate of about 65 %. The duration of unemployment beneﬁts is four years after
which the unemployed transit into the social assistance system oﬀering a lower (means tested) beneﬁt.
In terms of beneﬁt levels and duration the scheme is rather generous by international standards. The
other but equally important side of the scheme is the various requirements - employment conditionalities
- attached to claiming of transfers illustrated in the lower part of ﬁgure 3. During a beneﬁts p e l lt h e
requirements are stepped up from an initial requirement of active job search to full time activation. Upon
transition to social assistance there are similar requirements for people assessed capable of working. These
requirements underlines that receiving transfers is not a free choice as an alternative to work.
Figure 3: The Danish social safety net in case of unemployment
8Unemployment insurance is voluntary in Denmark and Sweden, but tax subsidized. Norway has a compulsory unem-
ployment insurance scheme.
7The system thus has a dual structure with respect to incentives via both generous beneﬁts (levels and
duration) and employment conditionalities. This policy package has the main purpose of changing the
eﬃciency-equity trade-oﬀ in the direction of making is possible to pursue ambitious distributional goals
without jeopardizing the incentive structure too much9.
2.2 Explaining the puzzle?
As illustrated in ﬁgure 2 the Scandinavian countries are a puzzle relative to the standard views on the role
of taxes and the social safety net for incentives. If anything this evidence seems to refute the standard
view. However, the puzzle may be explained by taking into account the employment conditionalities of
welfare arrangements, cf table 1. The table shows the results of the following simple empirical exercise
relating the labour force participation rate to the marginal eﬀective tax rate (metr), and two measures
aﬀecting the marginal value of non-working time for individuals namely publicly provided services in
kind (services) and expenses on active labour market policies (almp). Data is for 14 Western European
countries (EU15 minus Luxembourg and Greece and plus Norway) and applies to 2005. Data is measured
relative to the US10.
There are numerous measurement problems involved in assessing the role of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary incentives for labour force participation/employment. First, the participation constraint is
most binding for individuals with low potential market income, and hence by using aggregate labour
force participation, the role of incentives may be underestimated. However, there is no readily available
measure of labour supply for the potential low income group. Second, the role of conditionalities in
welfare policies is very diﬃcult to measure, and the expenditure levels are very poor indicators of the
whole complex of rules and regulations pertaining to receiving welfare beneﬁts.
Despite these reservations the results of the simple regressions reveal some interesting ﬁndings11 12.
First, the regressions are signiﬁcantly improved by the inclusion of the two measures related to the
employment focus of welfare policies, and the a priori expected signs are found to the employment
supportive variables. The ﬁrst column corresponds to ﬁgure 2 and displays a very poor ﬁt and a wrongly
signed eﬀect of the metr. When controlling for the employment conditionalities (services and almp)t h e
ﬁti m p r o v e ss i g n i ﬁcantly and the variables get the expected signs (also the metr variable) showing that
incentives are aﬀected negatively by the metr and positively by the employment conditionalities, and
this resolves the puzzle displayed in ﬁgure 2. The table also reports the regressions for men and women
separately, and the same qualitative ﬁndings appear, although as expected, the eﬀects are much smaller
9Conditionalities also serve the purpose of screening between the "deserving" and "non-deserving" , so-called targeting
or tagging, cf. Akerlof (1978). See also Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982). This screening may either arise via a gate-keeper
checking whether given eligibility conditions are met, or via self-selection, cf Besley and Coate (1992,1995).
10The results are almost the same if variables are not measured relative to US values.
11The estimation is presented here for labour force participation rather than employment since the latter involves demand
aspects. However, labour supply numbers may be boosted if agents not actively searching for jobs are included. Hence,
more explicit employment conditionalities may reduce registered labour supply. The estimation has also been made with
the employment rate (age group 15-64) as the dependent variable, with the same results.
12It is particularly noteworthy that the introduction of the two control variables implies a signiﬁcant improvement of the
explanatory power of the model (compare also ﬁgure 1), even though it remains parsimonious.
8for males than females, and in particular services in-kind have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on labour force
participation for females.
Table 1: Estimated labour force participation equation
Total Males Females
constant 3.30 5.23 4.40 5.22 1.96 5.22
(2.78) (3.95) (6.49) (4.31) (1.01) (2.71)
metr 0.23 -0.25 0.03 -0.18 0.46 -0.31
(1.07) (0.82) (0.22) (0.64) (1.34) (0.76)
almp NI 0.04 NI 0.03 NI 0.12
(0.55) (0.42) (0.51)
services NI 0.03 NI 0.03 NI 0.04
(2.96) (1.01) (3.71)
b R2 0.09 0.57 0.01 0.15 0.13 0.68
Note: Based on a cross-section estimation for 14 European countries (EU 15 minus Luxembourg and plus
Norway), data applies to 2005, except services where data is from 2003. All variables are measured relative to US
values. The metr is the marginal eﬀective tax rate applying to labour force participation (source: Eurostat), and
almp and services measure total outlays on active labour market policy in-kind beneﬁts (old age and family) in % of
GDP (source: www.sourceoecd.org). The regression is ln(p)= constant+a1 lnmetr+a2 lnalmp+a3 lnservices.
Numbers in parenthesis give the numerical values of the t-statistics.
In short, taking into account the employment conditionalities of welfare arrangements the Scandi-
navian puzzle is accounted for. Moreover, when including both pecuniary (metr) and non-pecuniary
incentives for work, the standard view that economic incentives captured by metr constitute a disincen-
tive to labour supply and employment is recovered in the data.
3 Employment conditional welfare policies and tax distortions
The preceding discussion of conditionalities point to the important role both pecuniary and non-pecuniary
incentives may have in aﬀecting labour supply decisions. The labour supply considered here is labour
force participation, i.e. the extensive margin of labour supply. The following presents a simple static
model13 showing how the introduction of employment conditionalities into the social safety net may have
important eﬀects on the determination of labour force participation and thus labour supply.
Consider a setting where individuals have diﬀerent abilities reﬂected in diﬀerent earnings (wages)
potentials. Index individuals by i (∈ [0,1]) and denote the potential wage for type i by wi. Wage
potentials are ordered such that they are increasing in i. Assume that abilities are distributed across the
population according to a continuous density function f(w) of potential wages14. An individual type i
13Andersen and Svarer (2008) show in a search framework how workfare elements in an unemployment insurance scheme
can shift the trade-oﬀ between insurance and incentives.
14Where f(w) > 0 for w ∈ [a,a],a n df(w)=0elsewhere.
U ∞
0 f(w)dw =1 .
9will have utility
U(wi(1 − τ)) − h
if working. U() (where U0 > 0,U00 < 0) gives the utility from consumption equal to disposable income
wi(1 − τ), where τ is the proportional tax rate. The disutility from work15 16is denoted h (note that
working hours are assumed exogenous).
The public sector oﬀers a beneﬁt scheme which provides a tax ﬁnanced beneﬁt( b) with an activation
requirement implying a disutility αh, α ≥ 0. Hence, utility if not working is
U(b) − αh
The parameter α captures the strength of the conditionality built into the beneﬁts c h e m eo ri ns h o r tt h e
activation requirement. In standard models α =0is implicitly assumed, i.e. the beneﬁt is unconditional
and the non-working has low income but enjoys more leisure.
The most straightforward interpretation of the α parameter is that there is a time consuming workfare
element attached to receiving beneﬁts, and the activation requirement is stated in terms of the share α
(∈ [0,1]) of the working hours of the employed (h). It is also possible to interpret α as measuring the
strength of the conditionality in terms of the foregone leisure due to time spend on job search or the
probability of shirking on job search and the implied sanction if detected.
An alternative interpretation is that the disutility from work captures the opportunity cost of not
being able to perform non-market activities (cooking, cleaning, taking care of the children, family etc.)17
or black-market activities. Hence, if the government supplies public services which are close substitutes
to non-market activities like e.g. day care facilities, it essentially works to lower the value of non-market
activities (see also Ngai and Pissarides (2009)). A high α thus corresponds to the case where the value
of having more time for home production is low, and vice versa for a high value of α.
Finally, the parameter α can also be interpreted as measuring the strength of work norms (see Lindbeck
(1995)), Lindbeck, Nyborg and Weibull (1998, 2003)). If α is large, it implies that the gain in leisure
from not working is small, which may reﬂect that it is a strong norm that one should be self-supporting,
and vice versa.
Reservation wage
Consider now the labour force participation decision18. The participation constraint for individual i
reads
U(wi(1 − t)) − h = U(b) − αh
Deﬁne the critical or reservation wage e w as
U(e w(1 − t)) − d = U(b) − αh
15All workers are assumed to have the same disutility from work. The model can easily be generalized to allow for
diﬀerences in disutility from work. This would imply that the non-working group will include both low productivity groups
and high value of leisure groups.
16Since working hours are exogenous h may be interpreted as the disutility of working a given number of hours, or the
hours multiplied by a marginal disutility normalized to one.
17Note that Rogerson (2007) takes into account that some public schemes subsidize market work.
18It is assumed that utility out of work is always higher when receiving the beneﬁts than when not receiving beneﬁts;
that is, the take-up rate among the non-employed is assumed to be 100%.
10The wage e w has the interpretation of a reservation wage determining whether there is an incentive to
work or not; that is
wi ≥ e w individual i is working
wi < e w individual i is not working
i.e. there is a skill or ability eﬀect determining who is working, and who is not. The high skilled (with
high earnings ability) work and the low skilled (with low earnings ability) do not work. Note that e w












i.e. the reservation wage is increasing in the tax rate and the beneﬁt level, but decreasing in the activation
requirement.




where metr ≡ τ + b
h w measures how the tax system aﬀects the economic consequence from transiting from
non-work to work, i.e. the sum of lost beneﬁts and the tax payment, cf. section 2. Note that the metr
is here measured for the marginal labour market entrant. The expression for the reservation wage in this
case makes clear how the reservation wage can be lowered (and work incentives strengthened) either by
strengthening pecuniary incentives to work (lowering metr) and non-pecuniary incentives (increasing α).
Employment











The public sector oﬀers a beneﬁt b to all out of work, and also provides public services (g). All of this









11where c ≥ 0 denotes the net costs of operating the activation schemes, and g denotes eventual other
public activities to be ﬁnanced by the tax. The budget constraint can be written




wf(w)dw is total (labour) income generated in the economy and thus the tax base. S is
the primary budget balance which in this stationary model (no debt) is required to be in balance.
Provided that the exogenous revenue requirement (g) is not too high there exists a unique stable
equilibrium to the model (see Appendix). If b is taken as the policy instrument the tax rate follows from (2)
and hence the reservation wage follows from (1) and determines the labour market outcome. To preclude
that the results depend on empirically implausible eﬀects the following only considers equilibria where
∂f(h w)
∂ h w > 0, i.e. the higher the reservation wage the more will at the margin be indiﬀerent between work
and non-work. This holds for any symmetric density function if the marginal entrant has a reservation
wage below the mean of potential market wages.
3.1 Labor supply and taxes












f(e w) < 0
i.e. both a higher tax rate and a higher beneﬁt level make work less attractive to non-work, and therefore
labour force participation decreases. This captures the standard incentive eﬀects of taxes and beneﬁts.
However, increasing the conditionality for beneﬁts, i.e. the work requirement (non-pecuniary incentives),







Hence, we can conclude that a conditional transfer scheme causes labour supply to be larger than a
passive transfer scheme having the same tax rate and beneﬁt level, i.e.
L(τ,b,α) >L (τ,b,0) for α>0 (3)
The intuition for this result can be seen from ﬁgure 4. All individuals with a potential wage above the
reservation wage (wi ≥ e w) will work . Since the reservation wage in the case of an activation requirement
is lower e w(α) < e w(0) for α>0, it follows that the activation requirement increases employment by the
shaded area in ﬁgure 4.
Figure 4: Reservation wages and employment
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denotes the fraction of the employed who are working at their reservation wage (φ(e w) is increasing in e w).
The elasticity of labour supply to the tax rate depends on the tax rate itself (via τ
1−τ ), the reservation
wage (e w), and the fraction of the employed (φ(e w)) who work at their reservation wage. The fact that
this elasticity depends on the reservation wage implies that the eﬀects of taxes on labour supply also
depend on the conditionalities in the transfer scheme19.
The interesting question is whether activation makes labour supply more or less elastic to the tax
rate (i.e. does a given tax rate distort labour force participation more or less when there is an activation




















19Note that (4) implies that the eﬀects of tax reforms can be assessed from empirical estimations of how employment
responds to taxes. However, empirical results are conditional on the prevailing conditionalities, and therefore empirical
evidence on tax elasticities can not readily be transferred across countries with diﬀerent social arrangements.
13Hence, on the margin a strengthening of the employment conditionality in the transfer scheme implies
that labour supply becomes less elastic to the tax rate. To phrase this diﬀerently, the stronger the
non-pecuinary incentives (α) the less important are the pecuniary incentives on the margin. Figure 5
summaries the main implication of the activation requirement for labour supply, that is, labour supply
becomes larger for any tax rate (cf (3)) and less elastic to the tax rate.








The fact that a given tax rate is less distortionary if there is an employment conditionality in the
social safety net is also captured by considering the so-called marginal costs of public funds (mcpf ). In
the case of linear utility the mcpf is expressed by a simple and easily interpreted expression given as (see







The mcpf is aﬀected by two margins, namely, how the tax rate aﬀects the tax base (τRτ
R ), and how
it aﬀe c t st h en u m b e ro ft r a n s f e rr e c i p i e n t s( τNτ
N ). It follows straightforwardly that the mcpf is larger
than one because an increase in the tax rate both reduces the income base (Rτ < 0) and increases the
number being dependent on transfers (Nτ > 0). However, the stronger the employment conditionality




The intuition is that the employment conditionality dampens the eﬀect of taxes both on the tax base and
the number of transfer recepients. In other words the disincentive eﬀects of taxes and beneﬁts for work
are counteracted by the activation requirement.
In sum we have seen that conditionalities in the beneﬁt scheme (activation) work to increase labour
force participation for given tax rates and beneﬁt levels (i.e. it counteracts the disincentive eﬀects of
14both), and moreover it makes labour supply (labour force participation) more inelastic and the marginal
costs of public funds lower (i.e. it becomes less costly to tax ﬁnanced public activities).
3.2 Welfare rationale for employment conditionalities?
The preceding has worked out some basic implications of employment conditionalities in the social safety
net. An important question is the welfare rationale for such conditionalities. This is a complicated
question since it involves the incentive and budget eﬀects of the policy, as well as the consequences for
both employed (tax payers) and non-employed (beneﬁt recipients).
The ﬁrst point to note is that employment conditionalities reduce the cost of ﬁnancing a given beneﬁt
level b under the condition that20
Sα = τRα − (b + αc)Nα − cN > 0 for α =0
i.e. there is a positive marginal eﬀect on public net revenue of an increase in the activation requirement.
Since Rα > 0 and Nα < 0 this inequality holds for c =0 . Hence, there exists a c such that the inequality
holds for c<c, i.e. the costs of activation should not be too high.21
If there is a positive revenue eﬀect of introducing the employment condition this suggests that there
is room for improvement either to lower taxes or to increase the beneﬁt level. Whether this is the
case depends critically on the social welfare function which should reﬂect concerns about distribution,
social inclusion etc. A utilitarian approach is widely taken in the economics literature to determine
optimal policies. There is however several reasons to question whether this approach captures well the
motivations underlying the social safety net in general, and employment conditionalities in particular.
While utilitarianism can justfy some redistribution (if marginal utility of consumption diﬀers), it is
based on the ability to generate utility (redistribution goes towards those with high marginal utilities
of income). The justiﬁcation underlying policy debates related to labour market and socially policies
usually goes wider. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail on these crucial but critical
issues, and it suﬃces to point to a few key observations. Policy debates on distribution are primarily
focussing on income/consumption rather than utility and the aim to avoid working poor is essential
in the Scandinavian countries. This partly reﬂects that income/consumption is readily measurable and
interpersonally comparable, and partly views on social inclusion. The latter stresses that policies should
aim at making life conditions as alike as possible irrespective of labour market status. Even though
substitution between consumption and leisure can attain a given level of individual utility, it is not
acceptable that some have low income (although they may enjoy much leisure) since this entails a risk
of social exclusion due to lack of economic means to participate in various activities on the same level
as other. It is an open question how social preferences should be formulated to capture these eﬀects,
but for the present purpose the main issues can be illustrated by taking a modiﬁed utilitarian approach
which captures the essence of the above argument. This may be termed a constrained utilitarian objective
20Public sector net-revenue is τR− (b + αc)N.
21Note that Besley and Coate (1992) argues that under full information the cost minimization poverty alleviating scheme
never includes a workfare element. The reason in their setting is that it crowds-out hours supplied to the private labour
market.
15function where the constraint is that the material living standard is not to fall below some minimum. In
the present formulation this amount to the the transfer not to fall below some minimum level, i.e. b ≥ b.




[U((1 − τ)w) − h]f(w)dw +
h w Z
0
[U(b) − αh]f(w)dw + V (g)









and the distributional constraint
b ≥ b
The details of this problem are worked out in the Appendix B.
(i) No binding distributional constraint
If the distributional constraint is non binding it follows that the optimal beneﬁtl e v e lb∗ exceeds the
minimum (b∗ ≥ b). In this case it can be shown that α∗ =0i.e. that the optimal policy package does
not include any employment conditionality.
One way to see the reason for this result is to start by noting that the employment conditionality
aﬀects the budget balance by
Sα = τRα − (b + αc)Nα − cN (5)
cf above. This is positive for low levels of α provided that the costs c of running the programmes are
not too high. Can an eventual budget improvement (Sα > 0)b eu s e dt oc r e a t eap a r e t oi m p r o v e m e n t ?








Hence if an employment conditionality is introduced, a higher beneﬁt rate has to be oﬀered if the utility
of the non-working should be unchanged. The budget eﬀect of a change in the beneﬁt level is
Sb = τRb − (b + αc)Nb − N<0 (6)
i . e . a ni n c r e a s ei nt h eb e n e ﬁt level worksens the public budget. Now can the revenue generated by
the employment conditionality covered the extra expenses induced by the higher beneﬁts to leave the
non-working non worse oﬀ?W eh a v e











Insering from (5) and (6) and using that ∂ h w
∂α = − h
Ub(b)
∂ h w
∂b implies Rα = − h






[−N − cN]dα < 0
16Hence, there is no scope for making an improvement to a policy package where b∗ >bby including
the employment conditionality. This case can also be seen a illustrating that under a classical utilitarian
social welfare function there is no rationale for introducing the employment conditionality (proof is given
in Appendix B).
(ii) Binding distributional constraint
In the case where the distributional constraint is binding we have b = b. For the employment condi-
tionality to be part of the optimal policy package it is required that
Sα |α=0> 0
i.e. it is a necessary condition that employment conditionalities have a positive eﬀect on public sector net
revenue for this instrument to be used. This is however not a suﬃcient condition since the planner also
takes into account that employment conditionalities have an opportunity cost in terms of disutility for
the non-working (absent this concern the revenue eﬀect would also be a suﬃcient condition). As shown
in the appendix an employment conditionality (α>0) is part of the optimal policy package for a policy
maker with a binding distributional constraint (b = b)i f
λ ≥ λ
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the public sector budget constraint. The intuition
is that the binding distributional constraint can be achieved at lower costs by including the employ-
ment conditionality, and this is welfare improving if the shadow price on public revenue is suﬃciently
high. In short, the employment conditionality is included when it allows the policy maker to achieve its
distributional constraint at lower costs.
The results above illustrates a general point. If the policy maker wants to reduce the beneﬁtl e v e lf o r
incentive reasons, but is prevented from so doing due to distributional concerns (the beneﬁtc o n s t r a i n ti s
binding), it may be optimal to use employment conditionalities since this makes it possible to strengthen
work incentives without jeopardizing the distributional concerns.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Recent experience shows that in some countries - notably the Scandinavian — high labour market par-
ticipation and employment rates coexists with high tax levels and generous social safety nets. This may
be interpreted either as a refutal of standard incentive arguments or as positioning these countries as
puzzles or outliers. However, agents react both to pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives, and therefore
a generous tax ﬁnanced social safety net can be made consistent with a high labour force participation
(employment) rate if the disenctive eﬀects arising from taxes and generous beneﬁts are counteracted by
other employment friendly measures.
This paper has argued that the Scandinavian experience can be accounted for when taking into
account that the social safety net has strong conditionalities linking transfers to employment. Hence,
the description of the social safety net as an unconstrained alternative to work is not appropriate for key
welfare schemes like unemployment beneﬁts and social assistance. Employment conditionalities serve the
purpose of maintaining an employment focus also for recipients of various beneﬁts in the social safety
17net. The interaction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives is important in determining labour
supply (participation), and taking this into account helps explaining both why labour supply may seem
surprisingly large given taxes and beneﬁt levels, and why high taxes are not causing larger distortions.
However, this also brings out the importance of policy complementarities, and it is an important condition
for maintaining a Scandinavian type welfare model that it ensures a high employment rate.
The main focus of the preceding discussion has been the extensive margin of labour supply (labour
force participation). The intensive margin (working hours) is equally important. A particularly inter-
esting question is to what extent the disincentive eﬀects of high taxes can be countered. Employment
conditionalities can more easily address the extensive than the intensive margin. Institutional arrange-
ments like centralized wage bargaining may work to lower the eﬀects of high taxes on the intensive margin
of labour supply if e.g. working hours are decided at a centralized level. The reason is that centralized
wage bargainers will internalize the public budget in its determination of wages and working hours (see
Summers et al. (1993)). An interesting question for future research is whether the tendency towards
more decentralized wage determination will strengthen the disincentive eﬀects of taxes on working hours,
and whether this can be countered by conditionalities in the social safety net.
Appendix A: Existence of equilibrium
The equilibrium to the model can be characterized by the following two equations:




τwf(w)dw =( b + αc)
h w Z
0
f(w)dw + g (budget) (8)
The policy parameters (b,α,g) are taken as given, while the tax rate τ is endogenously determined, i.e.
we have a system of two equations in the two endogenous variables (e w,τ). Note that (7) gives a relation
between the tax rate and the reservation wage , i.e. τ = φ(e w) for τ<1.D e ﬁne e w : U(e w)−d = U(0)−αd,








> 0 for e w ≥ e w
and
∂2τ




2 < 0 for e w ≥ e w
The budget constraint (8) determines the tax rate as a function of the reservation wage, i.e. τ = ψ(e w).
Note that






for e w → e w






































Note that the second derivative is generally ambiguously signed, but
∂2τ
∂ e w2 |budget> 0 for e w =0
The equilibrium is illustrated in ﬁgure 10. For the sake of argument, the ﬁgure below is drawn for the
case where it is assumed that ∂2τ
∂ h w2 |budget> 0 for all e w and g =0 .
Figure 10: Equilibrium tax and reservation wage.
A necessary condition for an equilibrium to exist is that there exists a reservation wage e w∗ for which
φ(e w∗) ≥ ψ(e w∗)
i.e. the needed tax rate to ﬁnance the expenditures arising at the reservation wage e w∗ falls short of
the tax rate needed to support this reservation wage. Intuitively this is only possible if the revenue
19requirement in the case of full employment is suﬃciently low (g< g ). Note that an equilibrium always
exists for g =0 , since in this case φ(e w) ≥ ψ(e w) and
∂τ
∂ e w
| participation > 0;
∂2τ
∂ e w2 |participation< 0
∂τ
∂ e w
| budget > 0;
∂2τ
∂ e w2 |budget> 0
Hence, monotonicity ensures that there exists a g such that an equilibrium exists provided that g<g .
















Note that this ensures that mcpf > 1 (see Appendix B).
Appendix B: MCPF and optimal policies




[U((1 − τ)w) − h]f(w)dw +
h w Z
0
[U(b) − αh]f(w)dw + V (g)
where V () is a concave utility function giving the utility of public consumption.












and the distributional constraint
b ≤ b




[U((1 − τ)w) − h]f(w)dw+
h w Z
0
[U(b) − αh]f(w)dw+V (g)+λ[τR− (b + αc)N − g]+μ(b−b)
(9)






− Uc()wf(w)dw + λ[R + τRτ − (b + αc)Nτ]=0 (10)
∂Γ
∂g
= Vg() − λ =0 (11)
∂Γ
∂α
= −hN + λ[τRα − (b + αc)Nα − cN]=0 (12)
∂Γ
∂b
= Ub(b)N + λ[τRb − (b + αc)Nb − N] − μ =0 (13)
μ[Ub(b)N + λ[τRb − (b + αc)Nb − N]] = 0 (14)
the second order conditions are assumed to be fulﬁlled.
(I) Marginal costs of public funds










R + τRτ − (b + αc)Nτ
Note that the Lagrange multiplier λ measures the marginal eﬀect on utility of a marginal increase in the
revenue requirement to the public sector. This is therefore a measure of the costs of raising revenue to
the public sector. However, it gives a metric measured in units of utility which is hard to interpret, and
therefore it is useful to transform it to a measure in monetary units. This can be done by relating the
Lagrange multiplier to the marginal utility of consumption, and in the present case it is convenient to do
this for the average wage, i.e. w = R
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> 1







22Note that stability ensures that mcpf is always larger than one, cf. Appendix A.
21We are interested in knowing how mcpf is aﬀected by a change in the work requirement in the beneﬁt












f(e w) > 0
it follows that mcpf can be written
mcpf =
1


























































and ∂ h w
∂a < 0, ∂R
∂α > 0, ∂
∂α
∂ h w








(II) Beneﬁts and active labour market policies
The optimal beneﬁt level solving (1) is determined by
Ub(b)=λ
∙
(b + αc)Nb − τRb + N
N
¸
for μ =0and hence b>b
Ub(b) <λ
∙
(b + αc)Nb − τRb + N
N
¸
for μ>0 and hence b = b
Consider an initial situation where α =0implying that the beneﬁt level is oﬀered unconditionally. We
want to explore whether there is a welfare case for introducing the conditionality.
The marginal welfare eﬀect of a change in the employment conditionality is
∂Γ
∂α
= −hN + λ[τRα − (b + αc)Nα − cN]
and hence the question is whether ∂Γ








22Moreover since∂ h w
∂α = − h
Ub(b)
∂ h w
∂b it follows that Rα = − h
Ub(b)Rb and Nα = − h
Ub(b)Nb and hence
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∙






hN [(b + αc)Nb − τRb] − NUb(b)cN
[(b + αc)Nb − τRb + N]
− μ
∙






−hN [(b + αc)Nb − τRb + N]+hN [(b + αc)Nb − τRb] − NUb(b)cN
[(b + αc)Nb − τRb + N]
− μ
∙







[(b + αc)Nb − τRb + N]
+ μ
∙










[(b + αc)Nb − τRb + N]
< 0
and (ii) for μ>0 we have
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> 0 if μ>
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≤ 0 if μ ≥ μ
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